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 A concessive statement is a compound 
statement that suggests and yet denies an 
expectation. For example: 
  
(1a) Although Tom studied hard (which  
         suggests he would pass), he did not pass  
 the exam. 
(1b) Tom did not pass the exam, although he  
         studied hard. (reversal of the order of the   
         clauses in the statement) 
  
 The parts of a concessive statement are: 
• the concessive clause – the clause that implies 
the expectation; it usually begins with a 
concessive connective such as „although‟ or „even 
though‟ 
• The presumption - a defeasible rule which 
expresses the „usual‟ pattern 
• the expectation – what is implied by the 
concessive clause together with the presumption 
• the main clause - denies the expectation; it can 
optionally begin with the word „nevertheless‟ 
  
In our example: 
„Although Tom studied hard‟ is the concessive 
clause ; 
„People who studied hard usually passed the 
exam‟ is the presumption; 
„Tom passed the exam‟ is the expectation; 
„He did not pass the exam‟ is the main clause that 
denies the expectation. 
  
 Concessive statements cannot be modeled in 
standard First Order Predicate Logic for two 
reasons:  
a) first, because FOPL does not model sentential 
connectives such as „although – nevertheless‟ 
that are not truth-functional; 
b) second, because the FOPL does not model 
deductions that are defeasible (which permit 
exceptions and reversals of previous 
inferences). 




  Concessive statements appear frequently in 
everyday reasoning. They are one of the eleven types 
of statement mentioned in the Ramchal‟s Sefer Derech 
Tevunos. In addition, in Talmudic discussions, every 
statement has a presupposition (hava-amina) and a 
conclusion (ka mashma lan).  
 This goal of this research is to organize the 
categorizations of concessive statements that are 
stated in the technical literature.   
  Using the distintinction in lomdus between  
dechiyah (overriding a law) and hutrah (removal of a 
law), a novel categorization can be added, according 
to the type of denial of the expectation by the main 
clause. That is the subject of  further research. 
 
  
I. According to How the Main Clause Denies the 
Expectation (Direct or Indirect) 
 In a direct concessive statement, the main clause 
is precisely the denial of the expectation: 
(3) Although Fred studied hard, he did not pass the 
exam. 
Here, the expectation „Tom passed the exam‟, is denied 
directly by the main clause „he did not pass the exam‟. 
  
In an indirect concessive statement, the main clause D 
implies the denial of the expectation, not-E, by some 
form of inference: 
(4) Although he does not have a car, he has a bike. 
Here, the presumption that „Normally, a person who 
does not have a car is not mobile‟ leads to the 
expectation that „he is not mobile‟. The main clause, „he 
has a bike‟, implies „he is mobile‟ and denies the 
expectation.  
  
II. According to Type of Inference of the Expectation 
(Deductive or Abductive) 
 In all the concessive statements presented so far, 
we infer the expectation by a deductive inference from 
the assertion of the concessive clause and the defeasible 
rule. For example: 
 
(5a) Tom studied hard for the exam  
(5b) If a person studied hard for the exam, then           
 usually that person passed the exam 
(5c) Therefore, Tom passed the exam 
 
 In an abductive inference, we infer from a 
conclusion what might be a reasonable explanation. For 
example, if it rained, then the grass is wet. Suppose we 
find that the grass is wet. It is invalid in deductive logic 
to conclude that it rained. However, the most reasonable 
explanation is that it rained.  
 Here is an example of a concessive statement with 
an abductive inference: 
(6a)  Theo was not exhausted, although he was     
 gasping for breath.  
The defeasible rule is not “gasping for breath causes 
being exhausted”. Rather, the trigger of expectation is 
an abductive inference: 
  
(6b) Usually, the reason for someone gasping for breath  
 is because he is exhausted 
(6c) Theo was gasping for breath 
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 III. According to the Source of the Presumption  
 Robaldo et. al. analyze three types of semantic 
relation that allow for „denied expectation‟ without giving 
rise to contradiction:  
a) Causality – the presumption is that there is a causal 
link between the situation in the concessive clause and 
the expectation, and causality can be blocked 
b) Defeasible Implication - necessary conditions are 
inherited from some type of prototype, and the 
inheritance may have exceptions 
c) Correlation – in a case where two events that correlate 
or anti-correlate, we have a presumption that if one of 
the two events occurs (as stated in the concessive 
clause), then the other event is expected to co-occur (or 
non-occur). A “surprising” divergence from the trend 
leads to denial of the expectation. 
  
Examples of Presumption from causation: 
(7) Although it is raining, we are going for a walk. 
The rain is a physical cause blocking us going out or 
directly reduces the likelihood of our going out for a walk. 
Nevertheless, we ARE going for a walk. 
(8a) Even though exhaust fans ventilated the building, 
the building still smelled of smoke from the fire. 
The causal presumption is as follows: 
(8b) Exhaust fans that ventilate the building cause the 
removal of the smell of smoke from the building 
  
Example of Presumption from defeasible implication: 
(9a) Even though penguins are birds, they are not able
 to fly. 
The ability to fly is inherited from the prototype of birds:  
(9b) Typically, birds are able to fly 
This expectation is rejected for penguins, which are 
exceptions to the defeasible rule. 
  
Examples of Presumption from correlation: 
(10) Although the company made money the first year,
 it lost money in subsequent years. 
The presumption of trend is that a company that makes 
money the first year will usually make money in 
subsequent years. 
(11) Although Benjamin Harrison was the loser in
 the popular vote, he won the presidential election
 of 1888 in the Electoral College. 
The presumption is that the presidential candidate who 
wins the most votes is usually the candidate who wins the 
election in the Electoral College. The victory of Harrison 
is “surprising” given his defeat in the popular vote.  
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The Notation 
 Our notational convention for distinguishing the 
parts of a concessive statement is as follows. We 
display in bold red the concessive clause (called C) 
that, together with We display in bold blue the main 
clause (called D) that denies that expectation. The 
concessive connective is underlined. If the 
presumption (called P) and the expectation (called E) 
are shown, they are displayed in parentheses.   
 Thus, the generic concessive statement has the 
following form: 
  
(2)Although A (and A and P together defeasibly 
imply E), (nevertheless) D.  
     (where D implies not-E) 
